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Abstract
We study online combinatorial auctions with production costs proposed by Blum et al. [4]
using the online primal dual framework. In this model, buyers arrive online, and the seller can
produce multiple copies of each item subject to a non-decreasing marginal cost per copy. The goal
is to allocate items to maximize social welfare less total production cost. For arbitrary (strictly
convex and differentiable) production cost functions, we characterize the optimal competitive ratio
achievable by online mechanisms/algorithms. We show that online posted pricing mechanisms,
which are incentive compatible, can achieve competitive ratios arbitrarily close to the optimal,
and construct lower bound instances on which no online algorithms, not necessarily incentive
compatible, can do better. Our positive results improve or match the results in several previous
work, e.g., Bartal et al. [3], Blum et al. [4], and Buchbinder and Gonen [6]. Our lower bounds
apply to randomized algorithms and resolve an open problem by Buchbinder and Gonen [6].
∗This work was done when the author was at Stanford University. Supported in part by ONR PECASE Grant
N000140910967.
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1 Introduction
Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items to allocate to n heterogeneous buyers to maximize
social welfare, that is, the sum of the buyers’ value for the items they obtain. When buyers have
combinatorial value functions over bundles of items, it is known as combinatorial auctions, a central
problem in economics and algorithmic game theory.
Combinatorial auctions are computationally challenging. For instance, when buyers have arbitrary
value functions, there are no polynomial-time algorithms that approximately maximize social welfare
within a factor better thanm1/2 (e.g., [5]). Moreover, if we take the strategic behavior of self-interested
buyers into account, i.e., focusing on polynomial-time and incentive compatible mechanisms, then even
computationally simple special cases become intractable. For example, there are polynomial-time ee−1 -
approximation algorithms when buyers have submodular value functions [18], but no polynomial-time
and incentive compatible mechanisms can be better than an mγ-approximation for some constant γ
[14].
Part of the difficulty of combinatorial auctions comes from the stringent supply constraints – the
seller has only one copy per item. In many applications, the seller may have multiple copies of each
item, or can even produce an arbitrary number of copies paying certain production cost. Therefore,
it is natural to consider variants of combinatorial auctions with relaxed supply constraints, hoping
that they are more tractable.
The first set of results along this line considers having logarithmically many copies of each item.
With Ω( 1ǫ2 logm) copies, an (1 − ǫ)-approximation algorithm is folklore because the standard linear
program relaxation of combinatorial auctions has an integrality gap of 1 − ǫ. Lavi and Swamy [16]
further showed how to convert this algorithm into an (1 − ǫ)-approximate and incentive compatible
mechanism. Bartal et al. [3] considered the online setting where buyers arrive online and the seller
must allocates to each buyer at his arrival without any information about future buyers. Assuming
the buyers’ value for any bundle is in the range of [vmin, vmax]
1 and there are Ω(log(vmax/vmin)) copies
per item, they introduced an O(log(vmax/vmin))-competitive
2 and incentive compatible mechanism.
Recently, Blum et al. [4] studied online combinatorial auctions in a more general model with
production costs. In this model, the seller may produce any number of copies of the items while paying
a non-decreasing marginal production cost per copy. The goal is to maximize social welfare less the
total production cost. The aforementioned model is a special case of the production cost model with
the marginal production cost being a zero-infinity step function. Blum et al. [4] considered several
simple marginal production cost functions, including linear, polynomial and logarithmic functions,
and proposed constant competitive algorithms for these special cases. They also studied general cost
functions assuming the values are between vmin and vmax, and introduced logarithmic competitive
algorithms. However, it is not clear if their competitive ratios are optimal, even for the special cases,
and there was no characterization of the optimal competitive ratio achievable on a per cost function
basis.
In this paper, we further investigate online combinatorial auctions with production costs. We
seek to develop a unified framework that provides online mechanisms/algorithms with the optimal
competitive ratios for arbitrary production costs using the online primal dual framework (see, e.g.,
Buchbinder and Naor [7] for a comprehensive survey). Informally, the online primal dual framework
considers the linear program relaxation of an optimization problem and its dual program, and designs
1An upper bound on values is necessary for any non-trivial competitive ratio. Otherwise, after the seller has exhausted
the supply of an item, there could be a buyer with value for the item arbitrarily large relative to the previous buyers’
values.
2Some previous work assume knowing vmax and, instead of vmin, the number of buyers, n. In this case, using
vmax/n as an effective vmin leads to O(log n)-competitive algorithms. Most techniques can be translated between the
two settings. We assume knowing vmax and vmin throughout this paper for consistency.
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Table 1: Competitive ratios for various marginal production cost functions (for arbitrarily small ǫ):
Blum et al. [4] This Paper
Linear, c(y) = ay + b 6 4(1 + ǫ)
Polynomial, c(y) = ayd (1 + ǫ)4d (1 + ǫ)(1 + 1d )
d+1d
Logarithmic, c(y) = ln(1 + y) 4.93 4(1 + ǫ)
online algorithms based on the structure of the linear programs and complementary slackness. It is
not clear, however, how to model production costs using linear programs. Instead, we use an extension
of the technique to convex programs and Fenchel duality following the recent work of Devanur and
Jain [12], Devanur and Huang [11], etc.
1.1 Our Contributions and Techniques
Our main contribution is a characterization of the optimal algorithms/mechanisms and their com-
petitive ratios for online combinatorial auctions with arbitrary production costs via an online primal
dual approach:
We start with a fractional version of the problem in Section 3, where there are infinitely many
buyers each of which wants at most an infinitesimal amount of each item. The fractional version
allows us to focus on the online nature of the problem, while ignoring extra complications from the
integrality gap of using convex program relaxations. Then, we characterize a parameter α(f) that
depends on the production cost function f , and show that (1) there are (α(f) + ǫ)-competitive and
incentive compatible mechanisms, and (2) there are no (α(f) − ǫ)-competitive online algorithms, for
arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. The optimal competitive ratio achievable α(f) is the infimum of parameters
α such that a differential equation parameterized by α has a feasible solution. More specifically, a
feasible solution to the differential equation with α = α(f) + ǫ would yield a relation between the
primal and dual variables in the online primal dual approach and, consequently, a competitive online
mechanism. Our lower bound is obtained by constructing a family of instances such that if there is an
online algorithm that is (α(f)− ǫ)-competitive for these instances, then there is a feasible solution to
the differential equation parameterized by α = α(f)−ǫ, contradicting our definition of α(f). In short,
our mechanism and lower bound for a given production cost function f reduce to the same differential
equation and thus are optimal. To the best of our knowledge, the only other work with this type
of characterization of the optimal competitive ratio is the work by Devanur and Jain [12] on online
matchings with concave returns. Finally, we stress that our mechanisms are incentive compatible and
their competitive ratios are optimal even when compared to non-incentive compatible algorithms.
In Section 4, we study the integral version and show that under certain conditions, the optimal
competitive ratios for the fractional case extend to the integral case with an arbitrarily small loss, say
ǫ > 0, in the competitive ratio. In particular, we have a ((1+ 1d)
d+1d+ǫ)-competitive algorithm for the
polynomial marginal production costs c(y) = yd and a (4 + ǫ)-competitive algorithm for logarithmic
marginal production costs. These results improve the competitive ratios previously achieved by Blum
et al. [4]. Our (4+ǫ)-competitive algorithm further applies to any concave marginal production costs.
We summarize these results in Table 1.
Finally, we consider in Section 5 the case when the buyers’ values are between vmin and vmax. We
use the same framework to derive nearly optimal incentive compatible mechanisms with a logarithmic
competitive ratio for supply-k online combinatorial auctions. As before, our mechanisms are derived
from the same differential equation that characterizes online combinatorial auctions. We also show an
almost matching logarithmic lower bound that applies to randomized algorithms, resolving an open
problem by Buchbinder and Gonen [6].
3
1.2 Other Related Work
There is a vast literature on maximizing social welfare in combinatorial auctions. In addition to the
related work we have already discussed, we refer readers to the survey by Blumrosen and Nisan [5]
and the references therein. Also, we note recent positive results by Dughmi et al. [13] when buyers
have coverage value functions or matroid rank sums value functions.
Our mechanisms fall into a family known as posted pricing mechanisms, where the seller posts
item prices to each buyer and let the buyer pick his favorite bundle of items given the prices. Posted
pricing mechanisms are incentive compatible and are widely used for revenue maximization (see, e.g.,
Balcan et al. [2], Chakraborty et al. [8], Chawla et al. [9]). Some of these results (e.g., Chakraborty
et al. [8]) also imply bounded approximation ratios for social welfare maximization.
All of the aforementioned results focus on the case when each item has only one copy, in which
case strong assumptions on the value functions are needed to achieve non-trivial positive results. On
the other hand, we consider the production cost model by Blum et al. [4], i.e., allowing multiple
copies of each item subject to production costs. As a result, we are able to achieve positive results
for arbitrary value functions.
Our primal dual approach is related to the recent work by Anand et al. [1], Gupta et al. [15],
and Thang [17] on the online scheduling problem using online primal dual analysis or dual fitting
with Lagrangian duality. Lagrangian duality is defined even for non-convex programs and therefore
can be applied to problems without a natural convex program relaxation. In contrast, we use convex
programs and Fenchel duality; fenchel duality is defined only for convex programs but generally
presents richer structures that guide the design and analysis of online algorithms.
2 Preliminaries
Let there be a seller with a set of m items, represented by [m], and a group of n buyers that arrive
online. We use i to represent indices of buyers, j to represent indices of items, and S to represent
bundles.
Each item j is associated with a production cost function fj : R
+ → R+ where fj(y) is the total
cost to produce y units of item j, i.e., the y-th (integral) unit costs fj(y)− fj(y− 1). Our results will
depend on certain technical properties of the cost functions which we will make clear in the theorem
statements. For simplicity of presentation, we assume all fj are identical and omit their subscripts
in the rest of this paper. Our results extend to non-identical fj’s as well, with a dependency on the
“worst” fj.
Let S be the set of available bundles that can be allocated to buyers. A bundle S of items is
represented by a vector (a1S , . . . , amS) where ajS is the number of units of item j in the bundle. We
assume S contains the empty bundle ~0 = (0, . . . , 0) and there is an upper bound ∆y on the maximal
number of units of each item in a bundle. Readers may think of ∆y = 1 and S = {0, 1}m as a concrete
example, which corresponds to the standard setting of combinatorial auctions. In general, ∆y can be
any positive number and S can be any subset of [0,∆y]m containing ~0. For simplicity of exposition,
we assume S = {0,∆y}m and say j ∈ S if ajS = ∆y. Our analysis extends to the general case.
Each buyer i has a private value function vi : S 7→ R
+ where vi(S) is buyer i’s value for getting
bundle S ∈ S of items. We do not require any assumptions on the value functions and allow them to
have arbitrary complement and substitute effects.
At the beginning, the seller does not have any information about the buyers, that is, vi’s and even
n are not known to the seller. Upon the arrival of each buyer i, the buyer reports a value function vˆi
(which may or may not be his true value function vi) and the seller (irrevocably) allocates a bundle
Si ∈ S to the buyer and charge a payment Pi, based on vˆi and the reported values and allocations of
4
previous buyers.
The resulting allocation rule along with the payment rule constitute an online mechanism. Since
the seller does not know the buyers’ value functions upfront, he needs to incentivize them to truthfully
report their value functions. A mechanism is incentive compatible if each buyer i maximizes the
expectation of his utility, i.e., vi(Si) − Pi, by reporting vˆi = vi. If the buyers are not strategic, i.e.,
they always truthfully report their value functions, then we only need the allocation rule which is
simply an online algorithm.
The objective is to allocate items to maximize the expectation of social welfare, which is the sum
of the buyers’ value for the bundles they get, less the total production cost, i.e.,
∑
i vi(Si)−
∑
j f(yj)
where yj denotes the total amount of item j that has been sold so far. We measure the performance
of mechanisms/algorithms under the standard competitive analysis framework. Let W (M) denote
the expected objective value of a mechanism M . Let OPT denote the optimal objective value in
hindsight. A mechanism M is α-competitive if there exists a constant β, independent of n and vi’s,
such that
W (M) ≥ 1α OPT−β
for all possible instances. Clearly, α is always at least 1, and the closer to 1 the better. Our goal is
to characterize the optimal competitive ratio α achievable by any online mechanisms/algorithms.
Posted Pricing Mechanisms A particularly related family of mechanisms are posted pricing
mechanisms. Upon a buyer’s arrival, the seller chooses item prices pj and lets the buyer pick his utility-
maximizing bundle, namely, argmaxS∈S vi(S) −
∑
j ajSpj, breaking ties arbitrarily. The mechanism
may use different prices for different buyers. Posted pricing mechanisms are incentive compatible and
are widely used for revenue maximization (e.g., [2, 8, 9]). Recently, Blum et al. [4] extended the use of
posted pricing mechanisms to online combinatorial auctions with production costs; in particular, the
price of an item j only depends on the amount of the item that has been sold. Thus, their mechanisms
can be represented by a pricing function p : R+ 7→ R+ where p(y) is the price per unit of item j
if y units of the item has been sold. In this paper, we characterize the optimal competitive ratio
achievable by any online algorithms and show that the optimal competitive ratio can be achieved by
the posted pricing mechanisms. See below for a formal description of the posted pricing mechanism
Mp defined by a pricing function p:
Algorithm 1 Mp, pricing mechanism with pricing function p
1: Initialize yj = 0 for all j
2: for i = 1, . . . , n do
3: Offer item j at price pj = p(yj) for all j
4: Buyer i chooses bundle S and pays
∑
j∈S pj
5: Update yj = yj +∆y for all j ∈ S
6: end for
Online Primal Dual Algorithms While our mechanisms are posted pricing mechanisms, we did
not commit to them a priori. Instead, we derive our mechanisms from a principled primal dual
analysis. Consider the following convex program relaxation (P ) of our problem, on the top, and
its Fenchel dual program (D) (see, e.g., Devanur [10] for more discussions of Fenchel duality and
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Appendix B for the derivation of the dual program):
maxx,y
∑
i
∑
S viSxiS −
∑
j f(yj)
∀i :
∑
S xiS ≤ 1
∀j :
∑
i
∑
S ajSxiS ≤ yj
x, y ≥ 0
minu,p
∑
i ui +
∑
j f
∗(pj)
∀i, S : ui +
∑
j ajSpj ≥ viS
u, p ≥ 0
In the primal program, variable xiS indicates whether or not buyer i purchases bundle S. Since
we want to maximize the objective function and f is an increasing function, we may assume without
loss that yj =
∑
i
∑
S ajSxiS , namely, the total number of units of item j that have been allocated.
In the dual objective, f∗(p) = supy≥0{py− f(y)} is the convex conjugate of f . When f is strictly
convex and differentiable, f ′(y) and f∗′(p) are inverses of each other. We interpret pj as the price per
unit of item j and ui as the utility of buyer i.
When ajS are binary and f is a step function that equals 0 for y ∈ [0, 1] and ∞ for y > 1, these
programs become the standard primal and dual linear program relaxations for the combinatorial
auctions, without production costs and with one copy per item (see Appendix A).
Upon the arrival of buyer i, there is a new dual variable ui and a set of new dual constraints,
ui ≥ viS −
∑
j ajSpj for all S. To maintain dual feasibility while minimizing the increase of the dual
objective, we let ui = minS viS −
∑
j ajSpj; by complementary slackness, we also let xiS = 1. This
allocation rule corresponds to letting buyer i pick his utility maximizing bundle with ui equaling his
utility. After the allocation, yj increases for each item j in the allocated bundle. Consequently, we
need to adjust the corresponding dual variables pj. In the offline optimal solution, yj and pj shall
form a complementary pair, i.e., pj = f
′(yj). In our online problem, however, the algorithm does not
know the final demand and, therefore, let pj be f
′’s value at some estimated final demand; in general,
we let pj(yj) be a function of the current demand yj.
Let P i and Di be the primal and dual objective values, respectively, after serving buyer i; let
P 0 and D0 be the values at initialization and Pn and Dn be the values at termination. Throughout
the process, we maintain a feasible primal solution (x, y) and a feasible dual solution (u, p). We
use superscript i to denote the current values of the primal and dual variables after serving buyer i
and before serving buyer i + 1. If we could show that Pn ≥ 1αD
n − β, then our mechanism M is
α-competitive since W (M) = Pn ≥ 1αD
n − β ≥ 1α OPT−β, where the last inequality follows from
weak duality. We call this the global analysis framework. On the other hand, it also suffices to show
that P i+1 − P i ≥ 1α(D
i+1 − Di) for all i; summing over all i we have Pn − P 0 ≥ 1α(D
n − D0), or
Pn ≥ 1αD
n − β for β = 1αD
0 − P 0. We call this the local analysis framework. We will use both
frameworks in this paper.
Remarks on Notation When ∆y = 1 and S = {0, 1}m, our setting becomes Blum et al. [4]’s
setting, except for the representation of production cost functions. In Blum et al. [4], there is an
increasing marginal production cost function cj for each integral unit of item j, whereas our production
cost functions fj are the cumulative version. If fj(yj)’s further take on value 0 for 0 ≤ yj ≤ k, and
+∞ otherwise, our setting essentially becomes multi-unit combinatorial auctions with multi-minded
buyers, as considered by Bartal et al. [3] and, more recently, Buchbinder and Gonen [6].
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3 Fractional Case
In this section, we consider the fractional case of our problem, that is, we assume ∆y is infinitesimally
small and let there be infinitely many buyers each of which buys infinitesimal units of items. The
fractional case allows us to focus on the online nature of the problem, while ignoring subtle treatments
needed to handle the integrality gap of the convex programs.
For the fractional case, we are able to characterize the optimal competitive ratio achievable by
online mechanisms/algorithms. We show that finding a pricing function p : R+ 7→ R+ that is a
feasible solution to the following differential equation for some constant β is a sufficient and necessary
condition of the existence of α-competitive online mechanisms/algorithms:
∫ y
0 p(y¯)dy¯ − f(y) ≥
1
α · f
∗(p(y))− β, for all y ≥ 0. (1)
Theorem 1. If a monotonically increasing pricing function p satisfies (1) for some constant β, then
the corresponding pricing mechanism Mp is α-competitive and incentive compatible.
Theorem 2. If there is an α-competitive algorithm, then there exists a monotonically increasing
pricing function p that satisfies (1) for some constant β.
We note that the integral version of (1) is equivalent to the Structural Lemma by Blum et al. [4]
and, perhaps not surprisingly, our mechanisms are posted pricing mechanisms.
Further, we define
α(f) = inf
{
α : there exist constant β and monotonically increasing p so that (1) holds
}
.
Corollary 3. For any ǫ > 0, there is an (α(f)+ ǫ)-competitive and incentive compatible mechanism.
Corollary 4. For any ǫ > 0, there are no (α(f)− ǫ)-competitive algorithms.
We stress that our upper bound holds for incentive compatible mechanisms, while our lower bound
holds for arbitrary algorithms. In this sense, the incentive compatibility constraint does not impose
any additional difficulties for online combinatorial auctions with production costs. We note that the
integral analogue of Theorem 1 is equivalent to the Structural Lemma in Blum et al. [4].
We present the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, respectively,
and characterize α(f) for some specific production cost functions in Section 3.3.
3.1 Mechanism (Proof of Theorem 1)
For notational simplicity, let Si be the utility-maximizing bundle that buyer i purchases and vi be
the value viSi . By the definition of pricing mechanisms, we have ui = vi −
∑
j∈Si
pi−1j ·∆y. (Recall
that we assume ajS ∈ {0,∆y}.)
By the definition of the convex programs, we have feasible solutions and Pn =
∑
i vi −
∑
j f(yj)
and Dn =
∑
i ui +
∑
j f
∗(pj) where yj and pj are the final demand and price for item j. To lower
bound Pn by the 1α fraction of D
n, we first rewrite
∑
i vi as a function of variables yj, ui, and pj:
Lemma 5.
∑
i vi =
∑
i ui +
∑
j
∫ yj
0 p(y)dy.
Proof. Let χj(i, y) be an indicator function that is equal to 1 if buyer i buys from the y-th to the
(y+∆y)-th units of item j via bundle Si. The buyer i’s utility is ui = vi−
∑
j
∑
y∈∆y·N χj(i, y)∆y·p(y),
where y ranges over all the nonnegative integer multiples of ∆y. Then,
∑
i vi =
∑
i ui +
∑
i
∑
j
∑
y χj(i, y) ·∆y · p(y).
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Next, we change the order of summation and account for the second term, i.e., the total payment, in
a different way:
∑
i,j,y χj(i, y) ·∆y · p(y) =
∑
j,y∆y · p(y)
∑
i χj(i, y)
=
∑
j,y≤yj
∆y · p(y).
As we assume ∆y to be infinitesimally small in the fractional case, the above reduces to
∑
j
∫ yj
0 p(y)dy.
The lemma follows.
Given the lemma, the primal objective is Pn =
∑
i ui +
∑
j
∫ yj
0 p(y)dy −
∑
j f(yj). We now show
that Pn ≥ 1α ·D
n −mβ, then the competitive ratio follows from the weak duality property. This is
equivalent to
∑
i ui +
∑
j
∫ yj
0 p(y)dy −
∑
j f(yj) ≥
1
α
(∑
i ui +
∑
j f
∗(pj)
)
−mβ.
Note that α ≥ 1 and
∑
i ui ≥ 0. Having positive
∑
i ui only helps the inequality. So, it suffices to
show
∑
j
∫ yj
0 p(y)dy−
∑
j f(yj) ≥
1
α
∑
j f
∗(pj)−mβ, which follows by summing up (1) over all items.
3.2 Lower Bound (Proof of Theorem 2)
We consider a family of single-item instances parameterized by v∗ ≥ 0, {Iv∗}v∗≥0, and show that if
there is an online algorithm that is α-competitive for all instances in the family, then we can construct
a monotonically increasing feasible solution to the differential equation (1).
The instance Iv∗ is defined as follows: let there be a continuum of stages parameterized by v
starting from stage 0 to stage v∗; at stage v, let there be a continuum of buyers with value v per unit
of the item and a total demand of f∗′(v). Since f∗′ and f ′ are inverses, f∗′(v) is the maximal amount
of the item that can be produced at a marginal production cost of at most v per unit.
Consider any online algorithm. Let Y (v, v∗) be a random variable denoting the amount of the
item sold up to stage v ≤ v∗ in instance Iv∗ . Let y(v, v
∗) be the expected value of Y (v, v∗) over
the randomness of the algorithm. Note that when the algorithm decides the allocation for buyers at
stage v, it does not have any information about v∗ other than that v∗ ≥ v. Hence, the distribution of
random variable Y (v, v∗) is independent of the value of v∗ for any v∗ ≥ v. We will omit the second
argument and simply write Y (v) and y(v) in the rest of the proof.
We first show that if there is a competitive algorithm, then there is a feasible solution to the
“inverse” of the differential equation (1):
Lemma 6. If there is an α-competitive algorithm for all instances Iv∗ , v
∗ ≥ 0, then there is a constant
β and a function y(v) such that:
∫ v∗
0 vdy(v) − f(y(v
∗)) ≥ 1αf
∗(v∗)− β, for v∗ ≥ 0. (2)
Proof. In instance Iv∗ , the optimal offline solution allocates f
∗′(v∗) units of the item to the buyers in
the last stage and none to the buyers in previous stages. The optimal objective value of social welfare
less the total production cost is
OPT(v∗) = v∗ · f∗′(v∗)− f(f∗′(v∗)) = f∗(v∗),
where the last equality follows from the definition of the convex conjugate function f∗ and properties
of the complementary pair v∗ and f∗′(v∗).
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On the other hand, the objective value achieved by the algorithm is
∫ v∗
0 vdY (v) − f(Y (v
∗)). By
the linearity of the first term and convexity of f , the expected objective value of the algorithm is at
least:
E[ALG(v∗)] ≤
∫ v∗
0 vdy(v) − f(y(v
∗)).
Therefore, if the algorithm is α-competitive, then there exists β such that for any v∗ ≥ 0,
E[ALG(v∗)] ≥ 1α OPT(v
∗)− β. Subsequently, there exists y(v) that is a feasible solution to (2).
The differential equation (2) is essentially the same as (1), except that a solution to (1) is p(y) as
a function of y while a solution to (2) is y(p) as a function of p. In particular, if there is a feasible
solution y(p) to (2) that is strictly monotone, then its inverse function would be a feasible solution to
(1) that is monotonically increasing. The rest of this subsection is devoted to constructing a strictly
monotone feasible solution.
Suppose the differential equation (2) is feasible for some α and β. For the same α and β values,
we let
y(v) = inf
{
y(v) : y is feasible for (2)
}
.
Lemma 7. (2) holds with equality for y.
Proof. For a given v∗ ≥ 0, by the definition of y(v∗), there exists a feasible solution y˜ to (2) that
takes value at most y(v∗) + ǫ at v∗ for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. In particular,
∫ v∗
0 vdy˜(v) − f(y˜(v
∗)) ≥ 1αf
∗(v∗)− β. (3)
Note that
∫ v∗
0 vdy˜(v) = v
∗y˜(v∗) −
∫ v∗
0 y˜(v)dv. By the definition of y˜(v
∗), the first term is at most
v∗y(v∗) + v∗ǫ. Further, by the definition of y, we have y˜(v) ≥ y(v) for all v. So, we have
∫ v∗
0 vdy˜(v) ≤ v
∗y(v∗)−
∫ v∗
0 y(v)dv + v
∗ǫ
=
∫ v∗
0 vdy(v) + v
∗ǫ.
Putting the above back to (3) and using the fact that f(y(v∗)) ≤ f(y˜(v∗)), we have
∫ v∗
0 vdy(v) + v
∗ǫ− f(y(v∗)) ≥ 1αf
∗(v∗)− β .
As it holds for arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, it also holds for ǫ = 0 in the limit. It follows that y is a feasible
solution to the differential equation (2). Further, (2) must hold with equality because otherwise we
could further lower the value of y while maintaining feasibility, contradicting our choice of y.
Lemma 8. y(v) is strictly increasing in v.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that y(v) is not strictly increasing at v = v∗. Consider (2) from v∗
to v∗ + dv for an infinitesimally small dv. Its left hand side remains the same while its right hand
side strictly increases, contradicting the previous lemma that says (2) holds with equality for y.
Theorem 2 then follows by that the inverse of y(v) is a monotonically increasing feasible solution
to (1).
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3.3 Case Study
In this subsection, we use the differential equation (1) to study two specific families of production
costs – power production costs and concave marginal production costs. It is easier to work with the
following version of (1) without integrals:
(p(y)− f ′(y))dy = 1αf
∗′(p(y))dp, for all y ≥ 0. (4)
On the one hand, if p(y) is a monotonically increasing feasible solution to (4), then integrating
both sides we get that p(y) is also a monotonically increasing feasible solution to the differential
equation (1). Note that it suffices to satisfy (4) with inequality, namely, its left hand side greater
than or equal to its right hand side. For the purpose of finding a feasible solution, however, the more
restricted equality version is more instructive.
On the other hand, if there is an α-competitive algorithm/mechanism, then, as in Section 3.2, we
can construct a feasible solution to (1) with equality. Thus, differentiating both sides we get (4).
Due to space constraints, we demonstrate only the theorems and defer the proofs to Appendix C.
Theorem 9 (Power Prod. Costs). If f(y) = ayγ+1 is a power function with γ ≥ 1, then α(f) =
(γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ . In particular, the pricing mechanism Mp with p(y) = (γ + 1)y
γ is (γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ-
competitive.3
Theorem 10 (Concave Marginal Prod. Costs). If a cost function f is such that f ′ is differentiable,
concave and strictly increasing, then α(f) ≤ 4. In particular, the pricing mechanism Mp with p(y) =
f ′(2y) is 4-competitive.
We remark that our upper bound for concave marginal cost functions is tight, because f(y) = y2 is
a special case of concave marginal cost functions for which α(f) = 4, by Theorem 9.
Finally, we present a theorem that unifies above two cases. Define Γ×f,λ = max
{
1,maxy>0
(λ−1)yf ′′(λy)
f ′(λy)−f ′(y)
}
.
It represents how fast the value of f ′′ could increase when its argument is scaled by a factor of λ,
because f
′(λy)−f ′(y)
(λ−1)y ≈ f
′′(y). When f ′ is concave, Γ×f,λ = 1. When f
′(y) = yγ , Γ×f,λ =
(λγ−λγ−1)γ
λγ−1 .
Theorem 11 (A Unified Theorem). For cost functions f with f ′ differentiable and strictly increasing,
the pricing mechanism Mp with p(y) = f
′(λy) is λ
2
λ−1Γ
×
f,λ-competitive for any λ > 1.
4 Integral Case
In this section, we consider the integral case of online combinatorial auctions where the constant
∆y is 1 and the set of bundles is S = {0, 1}m. We derive constant competitive mechanisms for
broad classes of production cost functions f . Our competitive ratios are arbitrarily close to the
fractional counterparts in Section 3, and are strictly better than those obtained by Blum et al. [4].
Our mechanisms are posted pricing schemes similar to their twice-the-index pricing scheme.
We use superscript i to denote the current values of the primal and dual variables after serving
buyer i and before serving buyer i + 1. For example, suppose yi−1j units of each item j have been
allocated so far, and buyer i observes item prices pi−1j and chooses his utility-maximizing bundle Si.
Then, we update the primal and dual variables as follows: xiSi = 1; y
i
j = y
i−1
j +1 for all item j in Si;
ui = viSi −
∑
j∈Si
pi−1j ; p
i
j = p(y
i
j) for all item j according to the pricing function p.
We use the following integral analogue of (4):
3Note that asymptotically (γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ ≈ eγ as γ goes to infinity.
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Lemma 12. If a monotonically increasing pricing function p satisfies, for all i,
pi−1j − (f(y
i−1
j + 1)− f(y
i−1
j )) ≥
1
α(f
∗(pij)− f
∗(pi−1j )), (5)
then the pricing mechanism Mp is α-competitive (and incentive compatible).
The main idea is that the integral case approximately reduces to the fractional case when the seller
has sold sufficiently many copies of an item for “nice-behaving” cost functions. Concretely, if the cost
function satisfies f(yij) − f(y
i−1
j ) ≈ f
′(yi−1j )dy
i−1
j (note that dy
i−1
j = 1) and f
∗(pij) − f
∗(pi−1j ) ≈
f∗′(pi−1j )dp
i−1
j , then (5) is essentially the same as the inequality version of (4). The contributions
when yj is not sufficiently large can be accounted for by the additive cost β.
4 Due to the space
constraint, we defer proofs to Appendix D.1.
Theorem 13 (Power Prod. Costs). For a power cost function f(y) = ayγ+1, the pricing mechanism
Mp with p(y) = a(γ + 1)
2yγ is α-competitive with a sufficiently large additive cost, i.e., W (Mp) ≥
1
α OPT−
∑
j(
1
αf
∗(f ′(2ǫ )) + f(
1
ǫ − 1)) for ǫ > 0, where α = (1 + ǫ)
γ(γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ .
Theorem 14 (Concave Marginal Prod. Costs). For a cost function f with f ′ concave, the pricing
mechanism Mp with p(y) = f
′(2(y+1)) is 4(1 + ǫ)-competitive with a sufficiently large additive cost,
i.e., W (Mp) ≥
1
4(1+ǫ) OPT−
∑
j(
1
4(1+ǫ)f
∗(f ′(2ǫ )) + f(
1
ǫ − 1)) for ǫ > 0.
To unify the above two theorems, recall that Γ×f,λ = max
{
1,maxy>0
(λ−1)yf ′′(λy)
f ′(λy)−f ′(y)
}
from Section 3;
further, let Γ+f,λ,τ = max
{
1,maxy≥τ
f ′′(y+λ)
f ′′(y)
}
. If f ′ is concave, Γ×f,λ = Γ
+
f,λ,τ = 1. If f
′(y) = yγ ,
Γ×f,λ =
(λγ−λγ−1)γ
λγ−1 and Γ
+
f,λ,τ is 1 for γ ≤ 1 and is (1 +
λ
τ )
γ−1 otherwise.
Theorem 15 (A Unified Theorem). For cost functions f with f ′ differentiable and strictly increasing,
the pricing mechanism Mp with p(y) = f
′(λ(y + 1)) is α-competitive for α = (1+ǫ)λ
2
λ−1 · Γ
+
f,λ,λ/ǫ · Γ
×
f,λ
and arbitrarily small ǫ > 0.
Comparisons with Previous Results Blum et al. [4] considered a nearly identical problem and
showed constant competitive posted pricing mechanisms for several marginal production cost func-
tions: linear, polynomial, and logarithmic functions. In this section, we designed constant competitive
algorithms for broader classes of production cost functions. We show that our results apply in Blum
et al. [4]’s setting and improve those competitive ratios previously obtained. The two settings differ
in the representation of production cost functions: we use (cumulative) production cost functions
f whereas they use marginal production cost functions c. For each class of linear, polynomial, and
logarithmic marginal production cost functions, we construct a strictly convex and differentiable pro-
duction cost function f that matches c on each integral unit, i.e., f(y) =
∑y
l=1 c(l) for all (sufficiently
large) integer values y.5
For linear c(y) = ay+b, where a, b ≥ 0, we use the production cost function f(y) = a2y
2+(b+ a2 )y.
By Theorem 14, we get a 4(1 + ǫ)-competitive pricing mechanism, improving the previous ratio of 6.
For polynomial c(y) = ayd, where d > 1, we use production cost function f(y) = aSd(y) where
Sd(y) is given by Faulhaber’s formula for the power sum
∑n
ℓ=1 ℓ
d. For sufficiently large y values, we
upper bound Γ×f,λ and Γ
+
f,λ,τ and use these bounds to get the competitive ratio of (1 + ǫ)(1 +
1
d)
d+1d,
improving the previous (1 + ǫ)4d ratio.
4Note that additive costs are necessary as shown in Lemma A.1 in Blum et al. [4].
5The equality is necessary, since the cost contributes negatively to the social welfare and optimizing the modified
social welfare objective with a multiplicative approximate cost function does not lead to an approximately optimal
solution with respect to the original social welfare objective.
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For logarithmic c(y) = ln(1+y), we use a production cost function f with a continuous, piecewise-
linear, and concave first derivative f ′ such that
∫ i+1
i f
′(y)dy = c(i + 1) for all i. By Theorem 14,
we get a competitive ratio of 4(1 + ǫ) which is strictly better than the previous competitive ratio of
2/ ln(3/2) ≈ 4.93. Our results further applies to any concave marginal cost functions.
Note that ǫ can be arbitrarily small subject to a tradeoff in the additive cost in all of the above
results. See Table 1 for a summary of our improvements and Appendix D.2 for the details.
5 Limited k-Supply Case
In this section, we consider the limited supply version of the online combinatorial auction problem,
also known as the multi-unit combinatorial auction with multi-minded buyers. We show how to apply
our primal-dual approach to this setting and get competitive ratios matching those in Bartal et al.
[3] and Buchbinder and Gonen [6]. All proofs are in Appendix E.1.
In the limited supply case, items are allocated integrally and there are exactly k units of each
item for sale. In this setting, ∆y = 1; S = {0, 1}m; and f(y) = 0 for y ∈ [0, k] and f(y) = +∞
for y > k. Bartal et al. [3] and Buchbinder and Gonen [6] showed an O(k((mρ)1/k − 1))-competitive
algorithm, where ρ = vmax/vmin, vmax = maxi,S viS , and vmin = mini,S:viS>0 viS .
6 This competitive
ratio is O(log(mρ)) when the supply is at least k = Ω(logm).
We first briefly discuss the fractional case to build our intuition. Again, it suffices to construct a
pricing function that is a feasible solution to (4) (where f∗(p) = kp). Further, since the values are
bounded by vmin and vmax, we may let p(0) = vmin/m without loss of generality (so that the initial
price of all bundles are at most vmin), and it suffices to satisfy (4) for v ≥ 0 s.t. p(v) ≤ vmax. Thus,
(4) becomes: for all y ≥ 0 such that p(y) ≤ vmax,
(p(y)− f ′(y))dy = kαdp.
Since f ′(y) = 0 for 0 ≤ y ≤ k and +∞ for y > k, we get that p · dy = kαdp for 0 ≤ y ≤ k
and p(k) ≥ vmax. By the first equation, p(y) = p(0) · exp(
α
k y). By the boundary condition that
p(0) = vmin/m and p(k) ≥ vmax, let α = ln(mρ). Thus, the fractional solution p(y) = p(0)(mρ)
y/k is
a natural candidate solution. For technical reasons, we decrease the starting price p(0) by a factor of
2 and use p(y) = p(0)(2mρ)y/k in the integral case.
Theorem 16. The pricing mechanism Mp with p(y) = p(0)r
y, where p(0) = vmin2m and r = (2mρ)
1/k,
is Θ(k((2mρ)1/k − 1))-competitive and incentive compatible for combinatorial auctions with supply k.
Recall that when k = Ω(logm), the competitive ratio is Θ(log(mρ)), since k((2mρ)1/k − 1) =
k(e
1
k
ln(2mρ) − 1) ≈ k 1k ln(2mρ) = ln(2mρ). Buchbinder and Gonen [6] used a similar primal dual
approach based on the standard linear program relaxations that impose the supply constraint as linear
constraints (See Appendix E.1). Our approach is different in that we consider the supply constraint in
a broader production cost model using convex programs, i.e., “lifting” the supply constraint into the
objective. As a result, the pricing mechanism follows straightforwardly as a solution of a differential
equation. We believe this approach will find further applications on similar problems.
Finally, we use our framework to show an almost matching logarithmic lower bound that applies to
randomized algorithms, thus resolving an open problem by Buchbinder and Gonen [6] on if randomized
algorithms can overcome the logarithmic lower bound.
Theorem 17. No online algorithms are o( logmlog logm + log ρ)-competitive for combinatorial auctions.
6Only the ratio vmax/vmin matters. So we may assume vmin is 1 after scaling. Note the knowledge of vmax is necessary
to obtain a non-trivial competitive ratio, as shown in [6].
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A LP for the Single-Unit Combinatorial Auction Problem
In the single-unit combinatorial auction problem, the seller has m items, represented by [m], to
allocate to n buyers, represented by [n]. Let S be the the collection of all subsets of [m]. There are no
production costs, but there is exactly 1 unit available for sale for each item. The seller’s objective is to
maximize the total social welfare which is exactly the total aggregate value of the buyers’ respective
allocated bundles. The following are the standard primal and dual linear program relaxations for this
problem:
maxx
∑
i
∑
S viSxiS
∀i :
∑
S xiS ≤ 1
∀j :
∑
i
∑
S:j∈S xiS ≤ 1
x ≥ 0
minu,p
∑
i ui +
∑
j pj
∀i, S : ui +
∑
j∈S pj ≥ viS
u, p ≥ 0
The primal variables xiS indicate whether or not buyer i purchases bundle S. We have linear con-
straints that impose the conditions that a buyer purchases at most 1 bundle and that each item gets
purchased at most once. We have dual variables u and p: one variable ui for each buyer and one
variable pj for each item. To minimize the dual objective function, we let ui = maxS{viS −
∑
j∈S pj}
for all i, given the valuations viS and variables pj. We interpret pj as the price of item j and ui as
the utility of buyer i for buying his utility-maximizing bundle S at price
∑
j∈S pj.
B Derivation
We derive the dual convex program (D) from the primal convex program (P ) in Section 2 using
Lagrangian duality. For the linear constraints in P , we define the dual variables: ui ≥ 0 for each
buyer i; pj ≥ 0 for each item j; µiS ≥ 0 for each buyer i and bundle S; ηj ≥ 0 for each item j. We
define the Lagrangian function L, omitting the primal and dual variables in the function argument,
as follows:
L =
∑
i,S viSxiS −
∑
j f(yj) +
∑
i λi(1−
∑
S xiS)
+
∑
j λ
′
j(yj −
∑
i,S:j∈S ajSxiS) +
∑
i,S αiSxiS
+
∑
j βjyj
=
∑
j(yj(βj + λ
′
j)− f(yj)) +
∑
i λi
+
∑
i,S xiS(viS − λi −
∑
j∈S λ
′
jajS + αiS).
Then, the dual program is minu,p,µ,ν≥0maxx,y L. Given the dual variables, maxx,y L =
∑
j f
∗(p′j) +∑
i λi as long as p
′
j ≥ pj for all item j and viS−
∑
j∈S ajSpj ≤ ui for all buyer i and bundle S; otherwise,
maxx,y L is unbounded. Note that f
∗ is the convex conjugate of f , i.e., f∗(p) = maxy{py − f(y)}.
When f is strictly convex and differentiable, which is true for broad classes of production cost functions
we consider in this paper, f∗ is increasing and we have p′j = pj for all item j. Finally, we obtain the
dual program (D).
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C Missing Proofs from Section 3
Theorem 9. Note that α(f) is scale invariant: if p(v) is a feasible solution for (4) with respect to f ,
then a ·p(v) is a feasible solution with respect to a ·f for any constant a. So, we may assume a = 1γ+1
without loss of generality. We have f ′(y) = yγ , f∗(p) = γγ+1p
(γ+1)/γ , and f∗′(p) = p1/γ . Then, (4)
becomes
(p(y)− yγ)dy = 1αp(y)
1/γdp, for all y ≥ 0. (6)
Upper Bound: Note that p(y) = (λy)γ is a natural candidate because all terms in the above
differential equation would have the same degree in y and, thus, the contribution of y would cancel
out. Concretely, the differential equation becomes (λγ − 1) = γλ
γ+1
α . Choosing λ = (γ + 1)
1/γ
to maximize 1α =
1
γ
1
λ(1 −
1
λγ ), we have that the pricing mechanism Mp with p(y) = (γ + 1)y
γ is
(γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ -competitive. So, α(f) ≤ (γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ .
Lower Bound: Suppose p(y) is a feasible solution to the differential equation (6) for some constant
α. We need to show that α ≥ (γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ .
Let ǫ > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant. We let c0 = (1 − ǫ)
γ
α and inductively define ci+1 =
(1− ǫ) γ
α(1−cγi )
for i ≥ 0. We will first show the following lemma:
Lemma 18. For any i ≥ 0, there exists yi such that for all y > yi, y > cip(y)
1/γ .
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction. Let us start with the base case. Since y ≥ 0, we have
p · dy ≥ 1αp
1/γdp.
Rearranging terms, we have dy ≥ γαdp
1/γ = c01−ǫdp
1/γ and, thus, y ≥ c01−ǫ(p(y)
1/γ − p(0)1/γ). Note
that for (6) to be feasible, we have p(y) ≥ yγ . For all y > 1ǫp(0)
1/γ , we have p(y) > 1ǫγ p(0). Putting
together, we have y > c0p(y)
1/γ . So the base case follows.
Suppose y > cip(y)
1/γ for all y > yi. Then, by (6), we have
(1− cγi )p · dy ≥
1
αp
1/γdp.
Rearranging terms, we have dy ≥ γ
α(1−cγi )
dp1/γ = ci+11−ǫ dp
1/γ for all y ≥ yi and, thus, y − yi ≥
ci+1
1−ǫ (p(y)
1/γ −p(yi)
1/γ). For all y > 1ǫp(yi)
1/γ , we have p(y) ≥ yγ > 1ǫγ p(yi). Further note that yi ≥ 0.
Putting together, we have y > ci+1p(y)
1/γ .
Recall that for (6) to be feasible, we must have p(y) ≥ yγ . So ci < 1 for all i and {ci}i≥0 is
an increasing sequence. Since {ci}i≥0 is increasing and bounded, it converges. For sufficiently large
i, we have ci+1 ≤ (1 + ǫ)ci. So (1 − ǫ)
γ
α(1−cγi )
= ci+1 ≤ (1 + ǫ)ci and, thus,
1
α ≤
1
γ
1+ǫ
1−ǫc(1 − c
γ) ≤
1+ǫ
1−ǫ(γ + 1)
−(γ+1)/γ . As this holds for arbitrarily small ǫ, we have α(f) ≥ (γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ .
Theorem 10. Note that for the upper bound, it suffices to satisfy (4) with inequality, i.e., the left
hand side is greater than or equal to the right hand side. For λ > 1 to be determined later, let
p(y) = f ′(λy). Then, the inequality version of (4) becomes
f ′(λy)− f ′(y) ≥ 1αλ
2yf ′′(λy), for all y ≥ 0.
Since f ′ is concave, f ′(λy)− f ′(y) ≥ (λ− 1)yf ′′(λy). So it suffices to show λ− 1 ≥ 1αλ
2. To minimize
α, we choose λ = 2 to maximize λ−1
λ2
. For λ = 2 and, thus, p(y) = f ′(2y), we get α = 4.
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Theorem 11. By the definition of Γ×f,α, Γ
×
f,α ≥
(λ−1)yf ′′(λy)
f ′(λy)−f ′(y) or, equivalently,
f ′(λy)− f ′(y) ≥ λ−1
Γ×f,α
yf ′′(λy), for all y ≥ 0.
Hence, it is sufficient to show λ−1
Γ×f,λ
yf ′′(λy) ≥ 1αλ
2yf ′′(λy) or λ−1
λ2Γ×f,α
≥ 1α . The rest of the analysis
is identical to those of Theorem 9 and Theorem 10.
D Missing Proofs and Details from Section 4
D.1 Missing Proofs
Lemma 12. We first show that P i − P i−1 ≥ 1α(D
i − Di−1) for all i. For notational simplicity,
let Si be the utility-maximizing bundle that buyer i purchases and vi be the value viSi , such that
ui = vi −
∑
j∈Si
pi−1j . Note
P i − P i−1 = vi −
∑
j(f(y
i
j)− f(y
i−1
j ))
= vi −
∑
j∈Si
(f(yi−1j + 1)− f(y
i−1
j )),
and
Di −Di−1 = ui +
∑
j∈Si
(f∗(pij)− f
∗(pi−1j ))
= vi −
∑
j∈Si
pi−1j +
∑
j∈Si
(f∗(pij)− f
∗(pi−1j )).
Then, P i − P i−1 ≥ 1α (D
i −Di−1) is equivalent to
(1− 1α)vi −
∑
j∈Si
(f(yi−1j + 1)− f(y
i−1
j )) ≥ −
1
α
∑
j∈Si
pi−1j +
1
α
∑
j∈Si
(f∗(pij)− f
∗(pi−1j )).
As buyer i maximizes his utility, vi ≥
∑
j∈Si
pi−1j and the left hand side of the last inequality is at
least (1− 1α)
∑
j∈Si
pi−1j −
∑
j∈Si
(f(yi−1j + 1)− f(y
i−1
j )). After some algebra, it is sufficient to show
∑
j∈Si
pi−1j −
∑
j∈Si
(f(yi−1j + 1)− f(y
i−1
j )) ≥
1
α
∑
j∈Si
(f∗(pij)− f
∗(pi−1j )),
which follows from (5). Therefore, P i − P i−1 ≥ 1α (D
i −Di−1) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Summing the inequality P i −P i−1 ≥ 1α(D
i −Di−1) over all i, we obtain Pn −P 0 ≥ 1α(D
n −D0).
After rearranging terms and using the weak duality, we get
Pn ≥ 1αD
n − ( 1αD
0 − P 0) ≥ 1α OPT−(
1
αD
0 − P 0).
As the final value of the primal objective function is the total social welfare that pricing mechanism
Mp achieves, W (Mp), the lemma follows.
Theorem 13. For λ > 1 to be chosen later, we let the pricing function p to be p(y) = f ′(λ · (y + 1))
and initialize yj =
1
ǫ − 1 for each item j in Step 1 of Mp. Other primal and dual variables are still
initialized to 0, except for the prices pj which depend on variables yj. The left hand side of (5) can
be lower bounded as follows:
LHS = f ′(λ(yi−1j + 1))− (f(y
i−1
j + 1)− f(y
i−1
j ))
≥ f ′(λ(yi−1j + 1))− f
′(yi−1j + 1),
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where the inequality follows by the mean value theorem and the fact that f ′ is an increasing function.
Similarly, the right hand side of (5) can be upper bounded:
RHS ≤ 1α(p
i
j − p
i−1
j )f
∗′(pij)
≤ 1αλ
2(yi−1j + 2)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 2))
≤ 1αλ
2(1 + ǫ)γ(yi−1j + 1)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1)),
where the first inequality follows from the mean value theorem and that f∗′ is an increasing function;
the second from the convexity of f ′ and that f∗′ and f ′ are inverses; and the third from the initial
conditions.
It suffices to choose λ > 1 such that
f ′(λ(yi−1j + 1))− f
′(yi−1j + 1) ≥
1
αλ
2(1 + ǫ)γ(yi−1j + 1)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1)).
For power cost functions, this reduces to 1(1+ǫ)γ
λγ−1
γλγ+1
≥ 1α . As in Theorem 9, we choose λ = (γ+1)
1/γ
and obtain α = (1 + ǫ)γ(γ + 1)(γ+1)/γ . Note that P0 = −
∑
j f(
1
ǫ − 1) and D0 =
∑
j f
∗(f ′(2ǫ )). By
Lemma 12, the theorem statement follows.
Theorem 14. For λ > 1 to be chosen later, we let the pricing function p to be p(y) = f ′(λ · (y + 1))
and initialize yj =
1
ǫ − 1 for each item j in Step 1 of Mp. As shown in the proof of Theorem 13, the
left hand side of (5) is lower bounded by f ′(λ(yi−1j + 1)) − f
′(yi−1j + 1), and the right hand side is
upper bounded as follows:
RHS ≤ 1α(f
′(λ(yi−1j + 2))− f
′(λ(yi−1j + 1)))λ(y
i−1
j + 2)
≤ 1αλ
2(yi−1j + 2)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1))
≤ 1α(1 + ǫ)λ
2(yi−1j + 1)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1)),
where the first inequality follows the same reasoning as in Theorem 13; the second from the concavity
of f ′; and the third follows from the initial conditions yij ≥
1
ǫ − 1.
Then, it is sufficient to choose λ > 1 such that
f ′(λ(yi−1j + 1)) − f
′(yi−1j + 1) ≥
1
α(1 + ǫ)λ
2(yi−1j + 1)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1)).
By the same reasoning as in Theorem 10, we choose λ = 2 and obtain 1α =
1
4(1+ǫ) . Note that
P0 = −
∑
j f(
1
ǫ − 1) and D0 =
∑
j f
∗(f ′(2ǫ )). By Lemma 12, the theorem statement follows.
Theorem 15. For λ > 1 to be chosen later, we let the pricing function p to be p(y) = f ′(λ · (y + 1))
and initialize yj =
1
ǫ − 1 for each item j. The left hand side of (5) can be lower bounded as follows:
LHS ≥ f ′(λ(yi−1j + 1))− f
′(yi−1j + 1)
≥ λ−1
Γ×f,λ
(yi−1j + 1)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1)),
where the first inequality follows the same reasoning as in Theorem 13 and the second from the
definition of Γ×f,λ. Similarly, the right hand side of (5) can be upper bounded:
RHS ≤ 1α(f
′(λ(yi−1j + 2))− f
′(λ(yi−1j + 1)))λ(y
i−1
j + 2)
≤ 1αλ
2Γ+f,λ,λ/ǫ(y
i−1
j + 2)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1))
≤ 1α(1 + ǫ)λ
2Γ+f,λ,λ/ǫ(y
i−1
j + 1)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1)),
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where the first inequality follows the same reasoning as in Theorem 13; the second from the definition
of Γ+f,λ,λ/ǫ; and the third from the initial conditions y
i
j ≥
1
ǫ − 1.
Then, it is sufficient to choose λ such that
λ−1
Γ×f,λ
(yi−1j + 1)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1)) ≥
1
α (1 + ǫ)λ
2Γ+f,λ,λ/ǫ(y
i−1
j + 1)f
′′(λ(yi−1j + 1)),
which is equivalent to α ≥ (1+ǫ)λ
2
λ−1 · Γ
+
f,λ,λ/ǫ · Γ
×
f,λ. From here, we follow the same reasoning as in
Theorem 14.
D.2 Detailed Comparisons with Blum et al. [4]
We construct a strictly convex and differentiable production cost functions f given a marginal pro-
duction cost function c such that f(y) =
∑y
l=1 c(l) for all sufficiently large integer values y and apply
results in Section 4 to get constant competitive algorithms. The equality is necessary, since the cost
contributes negatively to the social welfare and optimizing the modified social welfare objective with
a multiplicative approximate cost function does not lead to an approximately optimal solution with
respect to the original social welfare objective.
Linear Marginal Costs Assume that the marginal production cost function is a linear function,
c(y) = ay + b, where a, b ≥ 0. We use the production cost function f(y) = a2y
2 + (b + a2 )y. It is
straightforward to check that f is strictly convex (over the domain y ≥ 0) and differentiable and that,
more importantly, f(y) =
∑y
l=1 c(l) for all integer values y. Furthermore, note that f
′ is concave.
By Theorem 14, we obtain a 4(1 + ǫ)-competitive pricing algorithm with some additive cost. This
improves upon the previous competitive ratio of 6.
Polynomial Marginal Costs Assume the marginal production cost function is a polynomial,
c(y) = ayd, where d > 1 and a > 0. Let Sd(y) be the degree d + 1 polynomial function given by
Faulhaber’s formula for the integer power sum
∑n
l=1 l
d, i.e.,
Sd(n) =
1
d+1
∑d+1
l=1 (−1)
δld
(d+1
l
)
Bd+1−ln
l,
where δld is the Kronecker delta and Bl is the l-th Bernoulli number. We use the production cost
function f(y) = a · Sd(y) = ad+1y
d+1 + ady
d + · · · + a0. Note that ad+1 and ad are positive. For
sufficiently large values of y, f ′′(y) > 0 and f is strictly convex. As the following competitive analysis
applies to f when y is sufficiently large, we may modify f for small values of y for the sake of strict
convexity over the whole domain. For any 0 < ǫ′ < 1 and sufficiently large values of y, we have the
following inequalities:
f ′′(λy) ≤ (d+ 1)dad+1(1 + ǫ
′)(λy)d−1,
f ′′(y + λ) ≤ (d+ 1)dad+1(1 + ǫ
′)(y + λ)d−1, and
f ′′(y) ≥ (d+ 1)dad+1y
d−1.
For such large y values, we can effectively upper bound Γ×f,λ and Γ
+
f,λ,τ :
Γ×f,λ ≤ (1 + ǫ
′)λd−1, and
Γ+f,λ,τ ≤ (1 + ǫ
′)(1 + λ/y)d−1 ≤ (1 + ǫ′)d.
We use these upper bounds in place of Γ×f,λ and Γ
+
f,λ,τ in Theorem 15 for sufficiently small ǫ
′ to get
the competitive ratio of (1 + ǫ)(1 + 1d)
d+1d for any ǫ > 0. This improves upon the competitive ratio
of (1 + ǫ)4d.
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Logarithmic Marginal Costs Assume the marginal production cost function is logarithmic,
c(y) = ln(1 + y). We construct a continuous, piecewise-linear, and concave f ′ such that the cor-
responding production cost function f satisfies f(y) =
∑y
l=1 c(l) for all integer values y. Then, by
Theorem 14, we get the competitive ratio of 4(1 + ǫ) which is strictly better than the previously
obtained competitive ratio of 2/ ln(3/2) ≈ 4.93. Our construction applies more generally for any
concave marginal production cost function c with a convex first derivative.
Let f(0) = 0. We define f ′ at integer points and let f ′ be linear over each interval [i, i+1] as follows.
In order to have f(y) =
∑y
l=1 c(l) for integer values of y, we need to have
∫ i+1
i f
′(y)dy = c(i+ 1) for
all i. To this end, we let
f ′(i) = c(i+ 1)− δ(i) and f ′(i+ 1) = c(i+ 1) + δ(i),
for a suitable nonnegative function δ to be chosen later. Note f ′(i+ 1) = c(i+ 1) + δ(i) = c(i+ 2)−
δ(i + 1). It follows that
δ(i + 1) = c(i+ 2)− c(i+ 1)− δ(i), for all i,
and any single value δ(i) completely determines the function δ and, consequently, f ′. For the concavity
of f ′, we note the slope of f ′ over [i, i + 1] is 2δ(i) and it is sufficient to have δ(i) decreasing in i.
Furthermore, since δ(i) ≥ c(i+2)−c(i+1)2 implies δ(i+1) = c(i+2)− c(i+1)− δ(i) ≤ 2δ(i)− δ(i) = δ(i),
it is sufficient to have δ(i) ∈ Ji = [g(i+ 1), g(i)] for all i, where g(i) =
c(i+1)−c(i)
2 .
We now show how to choose a value for δ(0) ∈ J0 such that δ(i) ∈ Ji for all i. We reduce the
interval [0, g(0)] to [g(1), g(0)] by inductively mapping the points g(i) to g¯(i) as follows:
g¯(2j) = g¯(2j − 1) + (g(2j − 1)− g(2j)), and
g¯(2j + 1) = g¯(2j) − (g(2j) − g(2j + 1)).
Accordingly, we map the values δ(i) to δ¯(i) in the interval [g(1), g(0)]. Note that δ¯ values superimpose
onto a single point, say δ(0), in the interval. In addition, the sequence of intervals J¯0, J¯1, . . ., where
J¯2j = [g¯(2j + 1), g¯(2j)] and J¯2j+1 = [g¯(2j + 1), g¯(2j + 2)], are nested by the convexity of c
′. It is
sufficient to choose δ(0) such that it is included in J¯i for all i. As there exists a point included
in the intersection of any infinite sequence of nested intervals, we let δ(0) to be this value. It is
straightforward to check that the resulting f is strictly convex. The construction is complete.
E Additional Materials for Section 5
E.1 LP for the Combinatorial Auction with Limited Supply
In the combinatorial auction with limited supply, the seller has m items, represented by [m], to
allocate to n buyers, represented by [n]. Let S be the collection of all subsets of [m]. There are no
production costs, but there are exactly k units available for sale for each item. The seller’s objective
is to maximize the total social welfare which is exactly the total value of the buyers of their respective
allocated bundles. The following are the standard primal and dual linear program relaxations for this
problem, which was used in Buchbinder and Gonen [6]:
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maxx
∑
i
∑
S viSxiS
∀i :
∑
S xiS ≤ 1
∀j :
∑
i
∑
S:j∈S xiS ≤ k
x ≥ 0
minu,p
∑
i ui +
∑
j pj
∀i, S : ui +
∑
j∈S pj/k ≥ viS
u, p ≥ 0
The primal and dual variables are the same as in the linear program relaxations for the single-unit
combinatorial auction problem in Appendix A.
E.2 Missing Proof of Theorem 16
Theorem 16. We first show that at most k units are produced and allocated for each item. Since
r = (2mρ)1/k, the price for the (k+1)-th unit of any item is p(k) = p(0)rk = p(0)2mρ = vmax. By the
assumption that buyers prefer the empty bundle to any nonempty bundle yielding the same utility
of 0 and the definition of vmax, no buyers will buy a bundle containing the (k+1)-th unit. Hence, at
most k units are sold for each item.
We now analyze the competitive ratio of the pricing mechanism Mp. By the construction of the
production cost function f and the pricing function p(y), (5) reduces to pi−1j ≥
k
α (r − 1)p
i−1
j . The
last inequality holds for α ≥ k(r− 1) = k((2mρ)1/k − 1), so we let α = k((2mρ)1/k − 1) and (5) holds
for all i. By Lemma 12,
W (Mp) ≥
1
α OPT−(
1
αD
0 − P 0).
Note that P 0 = 0 and D0 = 12vmink ≤
1
2 OPT. Furthermore, at least one unit of an item is bought by
a buyer since p(0) is small enough and there is a bundle of value at most vmin/2, and P
n 6= P0 and
Dn 6= D0. Then,
W (Mp) ≥
1
α OPT−
1
αD
0 ≥ 12α OPT .
Consequently, the final competitive ratio is 2α = Θ(k((2mρ)1/k − 1)).
E.3 Missing Proof of Theorem 17
The proof follows the same framework as Theorem 2. We present only a sketch in this paper.
Theorem 17. We first prove that the competitive ratio is at least Ω(log ρ) even for m = 1. Consider a
continuum of stages parameterized by v∗, from stage vmin to stage vmax. At each stage v
∗ ≥ vmin, let
there be k buyers with value v∗ for one copy of the item. Using the same argument as in Lemma 6
and Lemma 7, if there is an α-competitive algorithm for all instances v∗ ≥ 0, then there is a constant
β and y(v)’s as a function of v such that: for vmin ≤ v
∗ ≤ vmax,
∫ v∗
0 vdy(v) − f(y(v
∗)) ≥ 1αf
∗(v∗)− β,
where f(y) = 0 for 0 ≤ y ≤ k and +∞ for y > k, and f∗(v) = kv. Differentiating both sides, we get
that
(v − f ′(y))dy ≥ 1αf
∗′(v)dv, for vmin ≤ v ≤ vmax. (7)
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Since we have y(v) ≤ k for v ≤ vmax, vdy ≥
k
αdv for vmin ≤ v ≤ vmax. Rearranging terms, we have
dy ≥ kα
1
vdv and thus,
k ≥ y(vmax)− y(vmin) ≥
k
α ln
vmax
vmin
= kα ln ρ.
So, the competitive ratio α is at least ln ρ.
Next, we show that the competitive ratio is at least Ω( logmlog logm) even for ρ = 1. Let us assume
without loss of generality that vmax = vmin = 1. Let r = logm. We will define logr(m) + 1 =
Θ( logmlog logm) different instances, and show that no online algorithm can be better than
1
2 logr(m)-
competitive for all these instance.
For 0 ≤ i ≤ logr(m), instance i is defined as follows: let there be i stages; at stage j, 0 ≤ j ≤ i,
let there be krj buyers with value 1 for any bundle of size at least m/rj and value 0 otherwise. That
is, the buyers’ value per item is rj/m at stage j.
The optimal offline solution for instance i allocates all items to buyers at stage i, getting ri/m
value per item and, thus, the optimal social welfare for instance i, OPT(i), is OPT(i) = kri.
Assume for contradiction that there is a 12 logr(m)-competitive online algorithm. By the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, it is characterized by the expected total number of items
allocated up to stage j, denoted by y(j). Recall that y(j) is independent of i other than i ≥ j. Note
that it is also a function of vmin and vmax but we assume this implicitly and omit the parameters. Let
∆y(j) = y(j)−y(j−1) denote the expected number of items allocated at stage j (let y(−1) = 0). The
expected social welfare of the algorithm for instance i is
∑i
j=0∆y(j)
ri
m . Note that the contribution
of stage 0 to i − 1 is at most km · r
i−1
m =
1
r OPT(i) <
1
logr m
OPT(i), because there are km items in
total and item values are at most r
i−1
m in these stages. So if the algorithm is
1
2 logrm competitive,
it must get at least 1logr(m)
OPT(i) social welfare from stage i and, thus, ∆y(i) > kmlogr(m)
. Then, we
have y(logr(m) + 1) =
∑logr(m)
i=0 ∆y(i) > km, contradicting the supply constraint.
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